The Federal Civil Service System and The Problem of Bureaucracy by Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Federal Civil Service System and The Problem of Bureaucracy
Volume Author/Editor: Ronald N. Johnson and Gary D. Libecap
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-40170-7
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/john94-1
Publication Date: January 1994
Chapter Title: The Economics and Politics of Institutional Change in the Political
Arena
Chapter Author: Ronald N. Johnson, Gary D. Libecap
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8639
Chapter pages in book: (p. 177 - 188)8  The Economics and Politics of 
Institutional Change in the 
Political Arena 
8.1  Introduction 
By any measure, the federal government and its role in the development of 
the American economy have grown dramatically in this century. While there 
were some 100,000 federal civilian employees in  1880, by  1990 there were 
over 3 million. Concomitantly, federal government outlays, as a share of GNP, 
rose from approximately 2.4 percent in 1880 to nearly 23 percent in 1990 (US 
Department of  Commerce 1975, 224,  1114; U.S. Department of Commerce 
1991, 315, 330). These numbers certainly understate the influence of govern- 
ment in the economy because regulatory policies and transfer programs affect 
economic behavior far beyond what budgets and staffing levels alone would 
indicate. It is natural, then, for economists, economic historians, and political 
scientists to be concerned about the performance of government. Persistent and 
widespread complains about a lack of effectiveness and responsiveness on the 
part of the federal civilian bureaucracy suggest that all is not well in this vital 
sector of the economy. In this final chapter, we place civil service reform into 
the broader context of institutional change in the political arena. We argue that 
transactions costs are a more serious problem for political institutional change 
than they are for institutional change in the private sector. This condition has 
important implications if the civil service system is to be made more produc- 
tive and accountable to voters. 
Despite its problems, meaningful reform in the civil service system appears 
to be an elusive 0bjective.l To understand why the federal bureaucracy is so 
resistant to change, we have analyzed the forces behind the emergence of the 
civil service institution and identified the key attributes of it that contribute to 
the current problems of bureaucratic accountability and performance. 
Through most of the nineteenth century, federal workers were employed un- 
der a system of political patronage. Patronage was a popular institution, one 
177 178  Chapter8 
that carried none of the negative connotations that are associated with it today. 
Misgivings began to arise after the Civil War as the size of the patronage work- 
force grew and it became more difficult to manage. With growing scandals and 
allegations of  inefficiency  that embarrassed federal politicians,  the president 
and certain members of Congress passed the Pendleton Act in 1883, authoriz- 
ing merit employment. The gradual replacement of patronage with merit em- 
ployees illustrates the response of elected officials to an institution that was 
costing them electoral support. 
The development of the federal civil service system, creating a permanent 
bureaucracy and a vast array of bureaucratic rules, was the result of conscious 
decisions by successive politicians. The system has, in part, evolved in the way 
it has because of the objectives of elected officials and the confused political 
property rights that exist over the federal bureaucracy. As more and more fed- 
eral workers were placed into the merit service, rules and sanctions had to be 
devised to limit political conflict over the federal labor force. Bit by bit, federal 
workers were placed off limits to direct partisan use by politicians. As a conse- 
quence, attempts to restructure the civil service that would entail a shift of 
power either to or from the president will be met by opposition in Congress. 
We also have emphasized that institutional adjustments made by the presi- 
dent and the congress to shield federal workers from political manipulation to 
lessen  competition  over  the  bureaucracy  have  had  other  important  conse- 
quences. The emerging structure of  the civil service system set the stage for 
federal workers to emerge as a powerful interest group, one that will, unless 
sufficiently  compensated,  resist changes that are not  in  its interests. In this 
chapter, we examine another factor that limits the prospects for further civil 
servite reform-incomplete  information among voters about patronage and 
the effects of modifications  of the current system of  protective  bureaucratic 
rules. Popular perceptions about the evils of patronage have contributed to be- 
liefs about he undesirability of weakening civil service protections, thus aiding 
the cause of federal unions and contributing to the establishment of an organi- 
zation that is now resistant to change. As we discuss in the following section, 
perceptions matter because they affect the cost of transacting. Indeed, consid- 
eration of transaction costs is key for understanding the economics and politics 
of institutional change. 
8.2  Transaction Costs and Institutional Change in the Private Sector 
and in the Political Arena 
If  we are correct  that the civil  service system contributes directly to the 
problem of bureaucracy, then a question immediately arises about the potential 
for and consequences of institutional change in the political arena. Does the 
process  lead to efficient outcomes  as envisioned,  for example, by  Richard 
Posner’s (1980) description of the development of the common law or by Gary 
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political process will favor efficient institutional choice is a natural application 
of the standard Pareto conditions.  Assuming, for instance, that the political 
process mandates the transfer of  wealth to a particular interest group, policy 
instruments that generate wealth  transfers  at the least cost to voters would 
seemingly be favored over those that impose higher costs. Indeed, absent trans- 
action costs, this is a perfectly reasonable prediction. But information is in- 
complete and costly to obtain, making transaction costs positive. This problem 
is compounded by the incentive that interest groups have to mold information 
made available to voters in self-serving ways. These conditions suggest that 
the political process  will lead to institutional  choices that differ from what 
one would expect if  the notion of neoclassical economic efficiency were the 
dominating criteria. Moreover, as argued by Douglass North (1981, 1990), in- 
stitutions that inhibit economic growth and development can persist for long 
periods of time. These different views of institutional change in the political 
arena raise important questions because they bear not only on our understand- 
ing of the process of institutional change but also on discussions of the func- 
tioning of representative democracy and of reforming government (see Witt- 
man 1989; and Osborne and Gaebler 1992). 
The literature on institutional change in the private sector provides  some 
guidance on this issue. It is generally argued that market forces, arising from 
changes in relative prices, will lead to the beneficial creation or modification 
of  institutional structures.* That is, markets will erode those institutions that 
are out of  step with the economic environment. In this setting, institutional 
change occurs through negotiations among self-interested parties, each seek- 
ing to maximize the attainment of particular goals within the new structure. 
Since it takes iesources to create, utilize, and guarantee institutions, modifica- 
tions will be made only when the affected parties anticipate  individual  net 
gains from doing so. Lance Davis and Douglass North described the motiva- 
tion for private institutional change as follows: “It is the possibility of profits 
that cannot be captured within the existing arrangemental structure that leads 
to the formation of new (or the mutation of  old) institutional arrangements” 
(1971,59; see also Demsetz 1967). 
Even so, the process of private institutional change is complex and can be 
derailed by high transactions costs. The bargaining underlying the creation or 
modification of institutions involves debate over the aggregate benefits of the 
new arrangement and the distribution of those benefits among the various inter- 
ested parties. Negotiations can break down if there are serious disagreements 
about either the net benefits of institutional change or their allocation. Con- 
flicts, blocking cooperative solutions, can arise from, among other things, seri- 
ous information asymmetries among the parties, bounded rationality, and an 
inability to devise side payments to compensate those who believe that they 
will be harmed by institutional ~hange.~  These problems increase with the size 
and heterogeneity of the bargaining group. As a result, institutional changes 
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take place, or they emerge only in abbreviated form4  Nevertheless,  it can be 
predicted that institutional change in the private sector will most often foster 
aggregate wealth maximization. It is our contention, however, that this is often 
not the case for political institutional change. 
Although institutional change takes place both in private settings and in the 
political arena, the literature has not focused enough on the details of political 
bargaining to explain observed outcomes or to indicate why the process will 
likely vary between the two settings. North (1981, 1990) has been one of the 
leaders in  analyzing institutional  change, particularly  as it involves govem- 
ment. He has described a theory of the state that emphasizes the importance of 
its coercive power for promoting or for hindering socially beneficial  institu- 
tional adjustments. North has stressed the potential use of government by spe- 
cial interests and politicians to create local monopolies and other institutions 
that retard economic progress, but he has not addressed the particulars of the 
political process by which certain groups and institutions pred~minate.~ 
A key  difference between institutional change in the private and political 
arenas is the lack of a clear principal or residual  claimant in  politics, who 
can direct the process toward  efficient outcomes. In negotiations for private 
institutional change, such as the restructuring of a firm, the parties must reach 
agreement on the size and nature of the aggregate gains from the proposed 
reorganization and on the effect of  the change on the relevant principals,  in 
this instance, equity- and debtholders. If property rights are complete, the ne- 
gotiating parties represent the residual claimants, and they have incentives to 
collect data effectively  for forecasting the effects of the restructuring. Stock 
and bond  markets provide  mechanisms for evaluating the effect of  the pro- 
posed keorganization on the principals and for determining their incentives for 
supporting or modifying the plan. 
In the political arena, however, there are few parallels to this process.6 Politi- 
cal institutional change has economic consequences, but there are fewer oppor- 
tunities for the types of market trades that in private settings sort out the eco- 
nomic effects and channel the process in a wealth-maximizing way. Politicians 
are the agents of institutional change in the political arena, and they must be 
responsive to the demands of their constituents if they are to be reelected. Nei- 
ther politicians nor the organized interests to which they respond, however, 
bear the full social costs of their actions. Accordingly, constituents are moti- 
vated to demand and politicians to provide government services and transfers 
beyond what is socially optimal. 
Although interest groups will not get all that they demand, the costs imposed 
on others can be significant. The general electorate is usually considered to be 
so widely dispersed and the effect of transfers  for a single interest group so 
broadly spread that political opposition from taxpayers will be limited. Given 
organizing costs, there may be no effective means of assembling the political 
trades needed for socially beneficial policy adjustments. These conditions fa- 
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groups succeed in securing initial legislation, they will be able to seek addi- 
tional legislation to reinforce their political influence.* Importantly, limited or 
asymmetric information about policy effects can be especially beneficial to an 
interest group’s objective. Indeed, in the case at hand, it is through the selective 
use of information to influence popular conceptions about patronage that fed- 
eral unions have been able to strengthen their position and make further civil 
service reform more costly for politicians. 
8.3  The Legacy of Patronage 
An example of the importance of molding information to affect popular im- 
ages is the widely held opinion, promoted by federal unions, that patronage is 
an inherently evil institution that would be quickly reinstated by  politicians 
given the slightest opportunity. Federal employee unions are not the originators 
of this view. It comes from histories of the progressive era that discuss patron- 
age. As we show, however, federal employee unions have been skillful in capi- 
talizing on public fears of patronage by  labeling reforms of the civil service 
as returns to the spoils system. Further, these views of  patronage have  been 
incorporated into judicial opinions that constrain the actions that politicians 
might take with regard to government employees. Such judicial rulings serve 
to raise the political costs of addressing the problems of bureaucratic account- 
ability and productivity. 
In histories of the progressive era, the shift to merit is portrayed as a moral 
crusade (see, e.g., Hoogenboom 1968). Civic reformers fought corrupt politi- 
cians, who used patronage to ensure their own and their party’s reelection and 
continued ackess to the spoils. The overriding goal of reformers was the de- 
politicization of the federal workforce. Achievement of this goal was possible 
by  eliminating the tie between government employment and party affiliation 
and creating a politically neutral labor force, with the result that policy admin- 
istration could be based solely on expertise and professionalism. 
Although this is a popular conception of civil service reform, it carries with 
it a number of  myths that federal workers as an interest group have  found 
useful. First, it ignores the fact that patronage was  not always considered a 
problem. The spoils system was popular for a long time. It was viewed as a 
means of promoting democratic access to government and ensuring account- 
ability between government employees and their political mentors. Those who 
strayed from the desires of politicians could be (and were) fired. It is true that 
the institution began to exhibit management problems with the growth of the 
federal labor force after the Civil War. Even after the Pendleton Act was passed 
in  1883, however, patronage did not disappear in the federal government. It 
remained sufficiently popular among enough voters that it was replaced by the 
merit system only gradually over the following fifty years. 
Second, the popular view of civil service reform fails to recognize the incen- 
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electoral  support. If  representative  democracy  works as efficiently  as some 
claim, then those civil service reformers, who receive so much emphasis in the 
historical literature, were merely messengers of constituent interests to politi- 
cians (see Wittman 1989). As we have pointed out, the constituents involved, 
urban business  groups,  were well organized  and were particularly  affected 
by inefficiencies  and scandals in the large post offices and custom houses in 
the late nineteenth century. These were also the groups that were providing 
new  sources of  campaign funds. Accordingly,  federal politicians  had incen- 
tives to be responsive  to the demands of  these  constituents for institutional 
change. 
Third, the popular assessment of patronage, which is also emphasized by a 
number of  students of public administration, suggests an inherent tension be- 
tween politicians (especially the president) and bureaucrats over civil service 
protections and an irrepressible tendency of politics to intrude with a return to 
the spoils (see Lane and Wolf  1990; Levitan and Noden  1983). As we have 
argued, the reasons  that the Congress and the president replaced patronage 
with merit after 1883  remain in force today. Although patronage may be effec- 
tive for relatively  small government units, the problems of managing a large 
patronage labor force are too great, relative to any political benefits that might 
be obtained from abandoning a merit system. 
Finally, the belief that a politically neutral, professional bureaucracy  could 
be installed if patronage were removed and politicians held at bay remains an 
attractive, if naive, notion. What would motivate bureaucrats to be responsive 
to constituent demands under those sheltered circumstances remains a mystery. 
It would seem that accountability and productivity would become even greater 
problems if political  control were further weakened. Nevertheless,  the view 
that poiitical preferences, like gender and race, should not be a factor in gov- 
ernment hiring or removal decisions is now part of case law. 
These four myths about patronage have helped  shape the current institu- 
tional environment, and their legacy limits the types of reforms that are pos- 
sible when dealing with the problem of bureaucracy. The fear of patronage is 
a convenient ploy to which federal employee unions can turn in responding to 
criticisms about the performance of the bureaucracy, For example, the National 
Federation of Federal Employees opposed provisions of the Civil Service Re- 
form Act of  1978 granting  supervisors authority to award merit pay.  Union 
representative Sam Silverman claimed that the bill “allows for the ready politi- 
cization of the civil service. The bill, in short, represents a return to the condi- 
tions of 1883, prior to the enactment of the first civil service legislation” (US. 
Senate 1978,407).  In another example, the 1988 annual report of the American 
Federation of  Government Employees (AFGE 1988, 53), the largest federal 
union, emphasized that politicians would take away the benefits granted to fed- 
eral employees under the civil service system if they had the opportunity to 
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8.4  Judicial Interpretations of Patronage and the Costs of Further 
Institutional Change in the Political Arena 
Misconceptions about patronage have been incorporated in important court 
rulings that have further weakened the control of politicians over the bureau- 
cracy. These rulings have been generated by  cases involving state and local 
governments, but they have set precedents for what would be possible for civil 
service reform at the federal level. Although by the early 1950s patronage con- 
trol over rank-and-file positions in the federal government had essentially been 
eliminated, it remained a fact of political life at the state and local level until 
the 1980s. Indeed, while many states and cities passed laws restricting patron- 
age hiring, smaller jurisdictions seemed to function well with patronage (Wol- 
finger  1972). Nevertheless, the notion  that patronage was inconsistent  with 
good government led to judicial challenges to political hiring and firing in 
many jurisdictions. 
Patronage practices were addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Elrod v. 
Burns (47 U.S. 347 [1976]) and Branti v.  Finkel (445 U.S. 507 [1980]), where 
the Court decided that the First  Amendment  protects  individuals from dis- 
charge or threats of discharge solely because they did not support the political 
party in power.9 An exception to the judgment was made for positions  that 
involved policy making. Although employees were not to be fired for their 
political party affiliation, hiring or promotion on the basis of party was not 
explicitly ruled out by the Court. Nevertheless, these rulings largely abolished 
the established  practice  of  new administrations  coming into office, ousting 
government workers, and replacing them with party members. 
In 1989, tlie Supreme Court was asked to determine the constitutionality of 
other patronage practices involving the hiring, promotion, transfer, and recall 
of  rank-and-file government employees on the basis of  party affiliation and 
support. The complaint in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois (497 U.S. 62 
[1989]) involved an executive order issued by the Republican governor of Illi- 
nois proclaiming a hiring freeze. No exceptions were to be made without the 
expressed permission of the governor, and state agencies were to submit hiring 
requests to an office established by him. The complaint asserted that, in these 
hiring  requests, applicants were  screened for their vote in  Republican  pri- 
maries or for contributions to the party. Five individuals who brought the suit 
alleged that they had been discriminated against because they had not sup- 
ported the Republican party. In a 5 to 4 decision, the Supreme Court held that 
such practices violated the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech. 
The Rutan ruling is important because it virtually ended patronage hiring 
and promotion for most government jobs at all levels. It is also important be- 
cause the Court’s arguments clearly reflected a general distrust of patronage, a 
lack of understanding of current civil service constraints on politicians, and a 
failure to appreciate the problems of extending tenure guarantees for employ- 184  Chapter8 
ees in the public sector. Consider the statements of Justice Brennan, who deliv- 
ered the majority opinion of  the Court: “A  government’s interest in securing 
effective employees can be met by discharging, demoting, or transferring staff 
members whose work is deficient. A government’s interest in securing employ- 
ees who will loyally implement its policies can be adequately served by choos- 
ing or dismissing certain high-level employees on the basis of  their political 
views.” Brennan went on to argue that “the First Amendment is not a tenure 
provision, protecting public employees from actual or constructive discharge” 
(497 U.S. 74, 76 119891). In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens went even 
further in asserting a distinction between politics and administration when he 
stated that “this defense of patronage obfuscates the critical distinction be- 
tween partisan interest and the public interests” (497 U.S. 88 119891). 
Justice Brennan was incorrect in stating that firing civil servants for cause 
was a readily available management tool. As we have shown, this is not the 
case at the federal level. Both Brennan and Stevens were also incorrect in ar- 
guing that there is a clear distinction between politics and administration, that 
a few political appointees could ensure that the administration’s policies would 
be implemented by neutral, career employees. The statements by the two jus- 
tices ignored the agency problems face by politicians and securing the compli- 
ance of government workers in molding and administering policy. Moreover, 
they did not consider that senior career civil servants are involved in policy 
determination and that even lower-level career employees are in a position to 
channel the administration of policy toward particular constituents or toward 
professional goals that can be inconsistent with the interests of politicians. 
Justice Stevens was responding to the dissent of Justice Scalia, who argued 
that thh Court’s opinion assumed away the possibility that the benefits of pat- 
ronage could ever outweigh its coercive effects, “not merely in  1990 in the 
State of Illinois, but at any time in any of the numerous political subdivisions 
of this vast country. It seems to me that categorical pronouncement reflects a 
naive vision of politics and an inadequate appreciation of the systemic effects 
of patronage in promoting political stability and facilitating the social and po- 
litical integration of previously powerless groups” (497 U.S. 103-4  [  1989]).’O 
Scalia went on to argue that: “[tlhe whole point of my dissent is that the desir- 
ability of patronage is a policy question to be decided by the people’s represen- 
tatives” (497 U.S. 104 119891). 
The Court’s majority differed from Justice Scalia in its view of the respon- 
siveness of politicians to the demands of  voters regarding the desirability of 
patronage.  The history  of the extension of  the federal civil service system, 
however, seems to make it clear that politicians will choose to reduce patron- 
age whenever they perceive it to be in their political interests to do so. In 1883, 
the president and the Congress agreed to decrease patronage without any prod- 
ding from the Court. 
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by the justices both of patronage and of the relative benefits of a very protective 
merit system. Under patronage, federal employees were forced to pay political 
assessments. Such practices, however, did not imply that the net income of 
patronage workers was reduced below what they could earn elsewhere. The 
evidence presented in chapter 4 indicates that patronage workers were com- 
pensated for those contributions in the form of higher salaries, and, when the 
composition of the federal workforce began to shift toward merit employees, 
the federal wage fell until the 1920s.  In the nineteenth century, political assess- 
ments were condemned as unfairly forcing government employees to pay for 
the campaign costs of  their mentors. This view of campaign assessments on 
government workers remains today, and it was reflected in the Rutan opinion. 
Indeed, Justice Brennan claimed that “political parties [today] are nurtured by 
other, less intrusive and equally effective methods” (497 U.S. 74 [1989]). 
In the late nineteenth century, political parties did have other sources of cam- 
paign funding, and that undoubtedly made giving up patronage easier.” The 
suggestion that these other methods of  funding are “less intrusive” ignores 
what politicians  are expected to do in exchange for contributions.  Special 
interest-group legislation, as a payback, likely intrudes on the interests of tax- 
payers. This point seems to have been  missed by  the Court. Moreover, the 
Court neglected the role played by public employee unions in providing cam- 
paign funds to candidates. At the federal level, patronage may  be gone, but 
federal workers remain a major source of campaign funds. In fact, there may 
be little difference between patronage assessments and PAC contributions by 
civil service employees. Rank-and-file federal employees pay for their docu- 
mented salary advantages through union dues and PAC contributions arranged 
by  their unions. Even though it may  have been that politicians were able to 
extract a greater percentage of any given wage premium under patronage than 
they are under the current civil service system, federal employees were then, 
and remain today, a major source of campaign funding. 
8.5  Concluding Remarks 
In  an environment of interest-group politics  and vague lines of  authority 
over the federal bureaucracy, reform of the civil service system has become 
exceedingly difficult. For example, one remedy for the problems of account- 
ability and productivity among rank-and-file employees is more hierarchical 
control. Such changes would allow supervisors more discretion in rewarding 
and punishing subordinates. Although these incentive structures are common 
in the private sector, there are obstacles for their adoption in the federal govern- 
ment. Indeed, such arrangements have been proposed, tried temporarily, and 
then severely curtailed. For example, the Civil Service Reform Act of  1978 
authorized performance pay arrangements. Merit pay, however, was opposed 
by federal unions, and, when it was implemented for senior officials, politi- 186  Chapter8 
cians failed to provide  sufficient funds to make  the  rewards meaningful.12 
Hence, under the existing incentive structure for career employees, the motiva- 
tion to be very responsive to voters is quite limited. Ironically, under patronage, 
voters at least had  an opportunity  to remove bureaucrats  from office every 
few years. 
Other popular reform proposals have been superficial. Although David Os- 
borne  and  Ted  Gaebler  argued  that  “we  obviously  need  some  protection 
against patronage hiring and firing” (1992,130), they also recommended that 
the current civil service system be scrapped and replaced by a new one. They 
provided no details about the proposed institution, nor did they recognize that 
the civil service system developed as politicians and labor unions alike sought 
to replace  patronage  with  merit  hiring  and  other bureaucratic  protections. 
Many parties have a stake in the current arrangement, and significantly chang- 
ing it will be costly. 
Some reform of  the civil service system in response to the problem of bu- 
reaucracy is possible. The historical record is clear that institutions are modi- 
fied, usually slowly, in  response to changes in the benefits and costs of the 
groups directly affected by them. In the case of  the federal bureaucracy, the 
existing arrangement is imposing increased costs on politicians. Despite oppo- 
sition from federal unions, politicians have contracted out to the private sector 
an increasing amount of goods and services formerly provided by the federal 
civil service. Moreover, the size of federal bureaucracy has shown only modest 
growth in the past twenty years. As we have argued, organizational  size in- 
creases the costs of managing the labor force, and the federal bureaucracy has 
become one of the largest in the world. There is a growing sense that smaller 
government units  work better  and are more responsive to the demands of 
voters. 
Even though politicians will respond in some way to demands for institu- 
tional change, that does not suggest that the outcome in the political  arena 
will closely reflect standard economic efficiency criteria. Since there are high 
organization costs for effective and persistent lobbying, some groups are better 
able to exert political influence than are others. We have already stressed that 
federal employee unions are a well-organized and impressive lobbying force. 
They have succeeded in establishing an institutional structure that benefits their 
members, and they will devote resources to protect their gains. Added to this 
is the widely held belief that any major change in the current arrangement 
invites a return to patronage. If  reforms to improve the productivity and ac- 
countability of the federal bureaucracy are portrayed as weakening the protec- 
tions available to government workers, then they will be even more difficult to 
enact.  Although  it  is  always possible  to  imagine  institutional  alternatives 
whereby all parties could be made better off, in practice such outcomes may 
be impossible in a world of high information and transactions costs.13 Given 
the presence of transaction costs that are particularly apparent in the political 187  The Economics and Politics of Institutional Change 
arena, institutions that inhibit economic growth and reduce welfare can and 
will persist. 
Notes 
1. The most recent attempt at restructuring the federal bureacracy is that of  the 
Clinton administration (see Gore 1993). 
2. For a summary of  a broader literature on institutional change and the role of 
institutions in economic and political decison making, see Furubotn and Richter (1991). 
Specific work includes that by Williamson (1975, 1985), North (1981, 1990), Eggerts- 
son (1990), Ostrom (1986, 1990), and Libecap (1989a). 
3. For a discussion of some of the issues involved, see Libecap (1989b). 
4. Johnson and Libecap’s (1982) and Wiggins and Libecap’s (1985) analyses of 
generally unsuccessful private efforts to change property rights in fisheries and oil fields 
to reduce rent dissipation are cases in point. 
5. In their examination of efforts to secure government intervention for unitization 
of oil fields, Libecap and Wiggins (1985) do examine how private conflicts over the 
distribution of the gains of unitization spill over and impede political action. 
6. In the most extreme case, politics is viewed like a market, and vote-maximizing 
politicians are viewed like utility- or profit-maximizing individuals in a private setting. 
Although there are important insights to be gained from modeling politicians as self- 
interested actors and from incorporating economic theory into analyses of the political 
process, there are limits to the analogy. The key problem is the lack of a clear principal 
or residual claimant in political negotiations. At least among some authors, there is a 
sense that political institutions are an extension of  private ones. The notion is one of 
progression from private negotiations to ones that involve government, whenever pri- 
vate agreements break down. For example, the power of the state to reduce transactions 
costs through new institutional design has been used by Goldberg (1976) and William- 
son (1976) to explain the development of certain kinds of regulatory policies. We, how- 
ever, emphasize that, in the political process, new transactions costs are introduced that 
critically affect the outcome of institutional change. 
7. The implication is that institutional change in the political arena is unlikely to 
have the inherent efficiency attributes often associated with organizational change in a 
private market setting (see Williamson 1985). 
8. Johnson (1990) describes efforts that resulted in limited entry regulations in the 
Alaskan salmon fishery. The irony is that such regulations also created a group that was 
more effective at exerting political pressure. This group succeeded in restricting the 
development of a competing sector that had the potential to yield an even more effi- 
cient outcome. 
9. An implication that follows from these rulings and the discussion presented in 
chap. 6 is that voter participation rates for state and local employees should decline 
relative to that of their private-sector counterparts. Johnson and Libecap (1991) provide 
evidence that those rates have fallen over time. 
10. As we pointed out in chap. 2, patronage served a variety of  goals, one of which 
was  to democratize  government employment.  It  is  likely  that  civil  service  reform 
worked against immigrants and other unorganized groups, who were denied access to 
government jobs. The tests that were subsequently adopted at the behest of influential 
business groups emphasized expertise and professionalism, and they likely served the 
interests of these groups. 188  Chapter8 
11. Moreover, today both members of Congress and the president have their own 
staffs, and these are large. 
12. Moreover, as we have argued, Congress would be wary of providing new opportu- 
nities for the president and department heads to influence the bureaucracy in policy ad- 
ministration. 
13. As Ronald Coase explains, “The reason why some activities are not the subject 
of contracts is exactly the same as the reason why some contracts are commonly unsat- 
isfactory-it  would cost too much to put the matter right” (1960, 39). 